SPOTLIGHT #22: The Closure of the Strait of Hormuz: Does It Qualify as Force Majeure in International Contracts?

SPOTLIGHT #22: The Closure of the Strait of Hormuz: Does It Qualify as Force Majeure in International Contracts?

At Lead up, we are committed to providing our clients with the most innovative dispute resolution solutions to fit their specific industry contexts. To do that, we have to stay on top of the recent developments in our clients’ sectors, and analyse these developments in line with our clients’ needs. Every month, in “Lead up Spotlight”, we share with you, our colleagues, clients and prospective partners, our analysis on a recent development relating to dispute resolution in an industry that matters to us and to our clients.

This month’s Lead up Spotlight focuses on the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the question of force majeure in international contracts.

A chokepoint in crisis

The Strait of Hormuz, approximately 34 kilometres wide at its narrowest point, carries some 20 million barrels of oil per day, roughly 20 per cent of global seaborne oil trade and a comparable share of global LNG exports. From 28 February 2026, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) issued VHF radio warnings prohibiting navigation. On 2 March 2026, a senior IRGC official confirmed the closure and threatened any vessel attempting transit. P&I insurance was cancelled from 5 March 2026. Iran did not issue a formal declaration of blockade; however, the practical effect has been to render transit commercially and operationally impossible for the vast majority of operators.

Force majeure under French law

Article 1218 of the Civil Code, introduced by the ordonnance of 10 February 2016, requires three cumulative criteria: exteriority, unforeseeability, and irresistibility. Exteriority is satisfied: the closure results from a unilateral act of a foreign State, beyond any contracting party’s control. Unforeseeability will depend on the date of conclusion of the contract; given that tensions had been escalating since at least June 2025, contracts concluded after that date may face greater difficulty. Irresistibility raises the most demanding questions: French courts have consistently held that increased cost does not suffice, and the existence of alternative routes (the UAE-Fujairah pipeline, the Saudi East-West pipeline) may be invoked to argue that performance remained possible.

Where the impediment is temporary, obligations are suspended; where permanent, the contract terminates by operation of law (Article 1218). In parallel, the doctrine of imprévision or hardship under Article 1195 may offer a more appropriate remedy where performance has become excessively onerous but not impossible, allowing a party to request renegotiation or judicial adaptation. Article 1195 applies only to contracts concluded after 1 October 2016 and not contractually excluded.

Force majeure under English law

English law recognises no free-standing doctrine of force majeure; the question turns entirely on the express contractual clause, interpreted strictly. For contracts of carriage, the BIMCO CONWARTIME 2025 and VOYWAR 2025 clauses define “War Risks” to include blockades and entitle owners to refuse to proceed. The 2025 versions require owners, if requested, to demonstrate reasonable endeavours to obtain competitive insurance cover. Given the cancellation of P&I cover, owners incorporating these clauses are likely entitled to refuse transit.

In the absence of a contractual clause, the common law doctrine of frustration may apply where a supervening event renders performance impossible or radically different from what was contemplated (Davis Contractors Ltd v Fareham Urban District Council [1956] AC 696). The doctrine is narrow, and the foreseeability of the closure may weaken the argument. Where frustration is established, the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 governs the allocation of losses. A party that wrongly invokes force majeure risks its declaration being treated as a repudiatory breach.

Force majeure under international instruments

The UNIDROIT Principles (2016), Article 7.1.7, apply a more flexible standard than French law: the impediment need not have been unforeseeable in an absolute sense, but rather one that could not reasonably have been taken into account. A notice obligation applies (Article 7.1.7(3)). Article 79 of the CISG operates on equivalent principles; France is a Contracting State, the United Kingdom is not, though the Convention may apply where the rules of private international law lead to the law of a Contracting State. The ICC Force Majeure Clause 2020 expressly lists blockade, acts of war, and acts of government, and the Hormuz closure would appear to fall squarely within several of these categories.

UNCLOS (1982), Articles 37 to 44, guarantees transit passage through straits used for international navigation. Iran signed but has not ratified UNCLOS; it is nonetheless bound by equivalent customary international law rules. This dimension bears on the exteriority and irresistibility criteria, confirming the closure as an unlawful act of a foreign State.

Practical recommendations

The structural differences are significant: French law provides a statutory safety net (force majeure and hardship); English law places the burden on the parties’ own drafting; international instruments offer a more flexible transnational standard. Companies should review their force majeure clauses and governing law; verify compliance with notice obligations; assess whether the event qualifies as a war risk under charterparty clauses; evaluate the realistic availability of alternative routes; and consider renegotiation under Article 1195 of the French Civil Code, Article 6.2.3 of the UNIDROIT Principles, or an equivalent mechanism.

As we observed in Lead up Spotlight #13, which analysed the impact of US trade war tariffs on international contracts, geopolitical upheaval has a way of suddenly exposing the gaps in standard contractual risk allocation mechanisms. The Hormuz closure is a further and dramatic illustration of the same phenomenon.

Beyond substantive analysis, the effectiveness of a force majeure claim often depends on strict compliance with the contractual notification procedure. Many force majeure clauses prescribe specific requirements as to form, content, timing and addressee, and failure to comply may result in the loss of the right to invoke the event altogether. Lead up avocats is at your disposal to assist you in determining whether the Hormuz closure triggers your contractual force majeure or hardship provisions, and in drafting and serving the requisite notification in accordance with the applicable contractual and legal requirements.